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Tibbetts: The Concept of 'Experience' — Some Introductory Remarks

The Concept of "Experience"Some Introductory Remarks
Paul Tibbetts
Of the two questions, "What is experience?" and "What is experience of?" only
the latter is cast in meaningful form for only it is specific and therefore answerable. Rephrasing the question we would then ask, "What sorts of things are
experienced?" Is experience limited as Alice suggested to Kings , ships, sealing
wax and cabbages or does it also include such abstract entities as numbers, the
past, the center of the galaxy, or even ethical universals? In other words, is
'experiencing' synonomous with touching, tasting and seeing or does it also
encompass the subject matter of theoretical reflection?
Historically such questions have engendered what is termed the 'problem of
knowledge'. In epistemology, or the systematic study of the origins, criteria and
limits of knowledge, this 'problem' is whether the senses or the intellect are
primary in attaining and verifying knowledge. The alternative answers traditionally given to this problem can for our purposes be limited to three. Some have
argued for example that the senses alone are valid and reliable avenues to
knowledge, with reflection being restricted to extracting the principles of organization inherent in sensory experience. Thought or reflection, accordingly, are not
sources of knowledge in addition to the senses but simply assist the senses by
making explicit the full signification of immediate experience. Then there are
those theorists who have argued that the senses are not in themselves reliable
sources of knowledge; true knowledge they maintain comes only through speculative reason, meditation, philosophical intuition, or even conceptual analysis.
A third alternative which is becoming more and more popular in contemporary
philosophy begins by rejecting the above distinction between sensory and reflective
experience in favor of a distinction between action and thought, doing and knowing,
thus paralleling the Greek distinction between praxis and theoria. When John
Dewey once remarked that "things are had before they are things cognized"
he was rejecting the interpretation philosophers had historically given to the
experiencer-experienced relation. The conflict between traditional empiricism
and rationalism (the first two alternatives mentioned earlier) is largely based on
one uncritically accepted presupposition: that there is a physical world on one side
of our sense organs and a 'mental' or subjective world on the other side. The
problem then arises of how the two 'worlds' are related, and what role the senses
serve in this transaction. Inevitably this leads to the question of whether the
world on the other side of the senses can even in principle be known or
experienced at all. Not being experienced directly, what is on the other side of
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the bridge (what exists outside the sense organs) must be inferred; in fact the
'outer world' becomes a sort of postulated entity in the hands of some philosophers
who followed the arguments of empiricism and rationalism to what appeared
to be their logical conclusions. By denying that the senses are a sort of
'conceptual bridge' between an inner and an outer world, and rejecting the notion
that the relation between ideas and things is essentially a cognitive relation,
Dewey was seeking to reconstruct the entire experiencer-experienced relation. It
is in this way, therefore, that a reexamination of the concept of experience directly
bears on the 'problem of knowledge' as traditionally conceived.
There are of course a number of other ways to formulate and answer the
questions, "What sorts of things are experienced?" and "What is the relation
between theory and experience, reflection and experience, intuition and experience,
and feeling and experience?" On no account therefore should these three briefly
suggested alternatives be taken as exhaustive. I mention them since most
philosophers would generally consider them to be three of the more influential
and debated attempts to answer the above questions.
Some philosophers have also argued that we must distinguish between the
object of an experience as against the experience of that object. Is this a legitimate
distinction though? Let the reader arrest himself in the act of reading these introductory remarks and see if he can distinguish what is on the page before him
from his experience of it. What he will find is that the two are factually and
conceptually inseparable. If there are two relatively distinct experiences going
on it is between the experience of reading this page, on the one hand, and
your subjective reactions to it on the other, in the form of criticisms, evaluations,
doubts, and so forth. When in a court of law we are asked to state what events
we observed on a certain evening we are not being asked to interpret what
we saw. This distinction between immediately seeing something, as against
reflecting on it and drawing inferences from it, has a secure basis in everyday
experience and has been the starting point of more than one philosophy.
This distinction between immediate experience and reflection on experience
has its counterpart-as with so much else-in Greek intellectual thought. There
were those philosophers such as Parmenides and Plato who drew a sharp distinction
between sensory experience, which is subject to error and illusion, and metaphysical intuition. Philosophers influenced by Plato have always argued that
whereas the objects and events known through sensory experience are particular,
contingent, and relative to certain physical and physiological conditions, the objects
of wisdom or true knowledge are universal, necessary and eternally true. This
distinction between two levels of experiencing or knowing finds its counterpart
in the everyday distinction between theory and practice, a distinction already
present at the very beginning of man's speculation on himself and his world. The
first astronomer who proposed the theory that it is the planets which move
around the sun, or that physician who suggested that personality and temperment
were organically based, undoubtedly violated the common-sense experiences of
their contemporaries. The philosophical speculations of a Plato can therefore
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be seen as simply more abstract accounts of what reality ultimately consisted
of than the more limited interpretations proposed by physics, astronomy or
medicine. This dichotomy between two fundamentally different levels of experience, the theoretical and the sensory, generated the problem of the relation
(if any) between these ways of knowing. Are the objects of true knowledge
or wisdom superior to what is known through the senses? Does speculative
knowledge transcend the mundane reality of everyday experience? or is such
knowledge simply an aberration, a distortion of what is gained through the
senses? For example, does the use of LSD open up a higher reality hidden from
us in everyday experience? or are such mystical-like experiences simply the effect
of the drug on the chemical structure and metabolism of the brain? These are
certainly interesting and highly debatable issues and are not simply resolved
by appealing to common sense or to what is obvious. Nor are they resolved by
appealing to some authority. The drug user considers himself a more reliable
authority because better informed than the medical man; conversely, the latter
oftentimes argues that it is not a matter of personal experience at all but of
knowledge concerning the brain's chemistry. The issue therefore comes down
to whether we place more emphasis on experience as directly undergone or on
an analysis of the conditions underlying that experience.
At this point we could ask what it means to experience something 'directly'?
If we answer "with one's own eyes" we are saying in effect that we experience
something directly when my body (and especially my nervous system) are in the
presence of that something. But is experience in this sense a neurological or a
psychological activity? Without a retina and other relevant neural structures
visual experience would not be possible. Still, experiencing something also involves that the experiencing is my experiencing, that it is part of my stream of
present awareness, and that the object experienced sometimes comes with emotional, aesthetic, holy or valuative connotations. In other words, sensory experience
is not simply the passive registering of impressions by an observer but is permeated with subjective or psychological factors. These factors mayor may not
influence the resultant behavior of the perceiver, and may only accompany experience rather than affect it. In an y case, any descriptive account of experience
which eliminated reference to such features of experience would be like a
description of the play Hamlet which ignored the major character. There are some
theorists who would argue that a complete account of behavior could in principle
be given which totally by-passed the experiential or subjective dimension of human
perceptual activity. Still, the fact that experience is always mine and integrated
with a personal history suggests that the experiencer-experienced relation is not
equivalent to the relation between a nervous system and external physical
stimuli. This last point raises the entire question of the relation between the
nervous system and experience in general. If the nervous system influences experience-as it obviously appears to do-then to what extent is an inquiry into
these physiological conditions relevant to our understanding of experience? This
question directly opens up the mind-body issue, one of the most difficult and
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debated topics in the entire history of epistemology and philosophy in general.
It is at this point that the above problems concerning experience merge with
numerous other issues in epistemology, the discussion of which is beyond the
scope of this introduction. Let me suggest, though, that once experience is interpreted as something 'psychological' or 'subjective' then it is highly questionable
whether some form of dualism between experience and things , and between the
mental and the physical, is unavoidable. It is for this reason that the more significant attempts by philosophers to avoid psychophysical dualism begin by reexamining the very concept of experience itself.
In the series of papers which follow, it should be relatively easy for the reader
to detect where the sympathy of the various contributors to this issue lies. There
are those more empirically-minded thinkers, for example, who reject the possibility of experiences which would transcend the boundaries of the natural. observable world. Then there are those philosophers who gravitate toward intuitional
and semi-mystical views of reality and experience, thereby revealing their intellectual affinity with such thinkers as Plato, Augustine and Bergson. We then have
some contributors who emphasize the view of experience suggested above by
Dewey, which is largely a rejection of the senses versus reason dichotomy of
traditional empiricism and rationalism.
Finally we have the guest speaker discussing the relation between the presentwhich is where all experience occurs-and the past. This gives rise to such
questions as "If the past no longer exists except as reconstructed in the present
then what does historical knowledge consist of?" and "Is the past nothing more
than an extrapolation from present experience? Is not the past fixed once and
for all such that present thought approximates to it rather than postulates it?"
These latter questions lead directly to such problems as the relation between
experience and reality, and thus into the realm of ontology.
In conclusion, I hope that these brief introductory remarks will suggest to the
reader the great extent to which one's conception of what experience is is
influenced in various subtle ways by your overall theory of knowledge and, in
the final analysis , what you take knowledge to be. Furthermore, if you hold
that what is true and what is real are ultimately identical. and that only through
an 'intellectual intuition' rather than sensory experience do we confront or
grasp the true, then you have very definitely committed yourself to a particular
metaphysics or theory of reality. Conversely, if you argue that there is no realm
of knowledge transcendent to sensory experience then you also adopt a metaphysical stance. The concept of experience therefore lies at the crossroads of
a number of topics historically central to the process of philosophy: epistemology,
metaphysics, ontology, and the mind-body problem. The concept of experience
parallels in function, then, the legend of a map in so far as both provide the
indispensable key to understanding the complex subject matter in which they
are respectively imbedded and play so central a role.
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